The Potential Long Term Effects of Compromises to Recruit Quality and Senior Leader Decision-Making About National Defense
By Colonel Dianna L. Carson and Gary A. Roulier
Abstract:
Compromises in recruit quality have implications for unit structure, training, cohesion, reliability, and lethality. Historical information and empirical studies before and since the All-Volunteer Force are clear. While leaders may feel forced to make what they perceive to be short-term decisions to bolster recruiting by compromising quality standards for recruits, the effects tend to be longer term and often harmful.
Given the shifting demography of the United States, physical and mental health realities, and the job market projections for the next ten years, recruiting challenges will remain a problem for the foreseeable future. America’s strategic leaders will need to find a way to provide the appropriate throughput of manpower to meet national security needs, but they simultaneously need a full appreciation for how compromises influence national defense beyond meeting a recruiting goal. Second and third order effects of certain types of compromise can undermine America’s capacity to defend herself and her allies, as well as jeopardize other global missions.
This paper will draw on the considerable national security expertise of the retired admirals, generals, and ambassadors of the American College of National Security Leaders, as well as history and empirical research to define a better way to address military manpower challenges.
“What if we had a war, and no one showed up on our side?”
Dr. Lawrence J. Korb
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Logistics and Material Readiness
Introduction:
Struggles with recruiting the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) have been ever-present since its inception except for when the US labor market offered few job prospects (1) and when the Services mitigated the hardship by downsizing (2, 3). One of the recurring “fixes” for resulting recruiting shortages has been lowering the standards for enlistment (4); however, compromises in recruit quality have implications for unit structure, training, cohesion, reliability, and lethality. Historical information and empirical studies before and since the AVF are clear. While Defense leaders may feel forced to make what they perceive to be short-term decisions to bolster recruiting by compromising quality standards for recruits, the effects tend to be longer-term and often deleterious.
American military leaders cannot ignore changes to US demography, physical and mental health realities, dramatic shifts in generational perspectives, and ten-year job market projections. Recruiting challenges will remain difficult for the foreseeable future. America’s strategic leaders must find a way to provide the appropriate throughput of manpower to meet national security needs, but they simultaneously need a full appreciation for how compromises influence national defense beyond meeting a recruiting goal. Second and third order effects of certain types of compromise can undermine America’s capacity to defend herself and her allies, as well as jeopardize other global missions.
This paper examines several alternatives that should be considered before lowering standards. It will also argue that recruitment crises are nothing new and demonstrate both the frequency with which they occur and the Services’ typical responses. It will outline how lowering standards has and will affect readiness. This paper will focus on the Active Army. Examining the challenges faced by the other Services and the Reserve Components are similar, as all recruits are drawn from the same population. That said, the American College of National Security Leaders acknowledges significant differences exist and will expand upon them in future papers.
Finally, the prospects for significant improvement – alarmingly – are dampened by six key factors:
• In the past ten years, the portion of recruiting-age Americans who can meet minimum enlistment standards has fallen from 29% in 2013 to 23% in 2020 (5).
• In the same period the propensity to serve fell from 15% to 9% (6).
• Over the next ten years, the size of the American recruiting population will continue to shrink due to the decline in the birth rate and reductions in immigration rates (7).
• Current projections indicate a strong job-seeker market for the next ten years (8).
• The long-time practices and policies of the various Services that erode their influence and compatibility with Generation Z (9).
• The U.S. faces a $34 trillion deficit (10).
The direness of the situation should be dealt with, not as a fleeting blip in US military recruiting that can be mitigated on the margins, but as a different reality that requires strategies adequate to the emergency. As the former Commandant of the Marine Corps General David H. Berger said of the manning crisis in 2022:
This is a call to action. Current recruiting practices across the Joint Force are not producing adequate numbers of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. Meeting recruiting goals will require the military to reevaluate and adjust its methods, not double down on existing approaches in hopes of achieving different results. Lowering standards is not the answer. Throwing increasingly large sums of money at the problem is unsustainable and has a record of failure. Across the Joint Force, recruiting efforts are suffering from what some have called “the relentless momentum of the status quo,” which can no longer be accepted (11).
A Brief History of Military Recruiting Crises:
In his paper A Historical Perspective on Today’s Recruiting Crisis, military historian Brian McAllister Linn notes that “first and foremost, the current recruitment crisis is nothing new.” While his assessment is correct, some “baked in” realities are true of recruiting difficulties over time (12). America has struggled with recruiting repeatedly throughout the history of the AVF, but many mitigation measures taken before come with greater risk and cannot succeed in today’s ecosystem. Three recruiting crises that have occurred since the inception of the AVF in 1973 offer insights – immediately following our withdrawal from Vietnam; the period following Desert Storm; and the years following the onset of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
Post-Vietnam Era:
The first AVF manning crisis occurred immediately following the US withdrawal from Vietnam. By the end of 1973 – and despite increasing bonuses and benefits – the combat arms were short 38% of their recruiting goal. In addition, recruiting scandals forced the Army to discharge 16% of its enlistees and grant nearly 50,000 early discharges in 1974 (13). By the end of the decade, only 41% of Army enlisted Soldiers had a high school diploma (14), and the Army had to transfer Soldiers into combat units involuntarily to ensure combat units had sufficient troops. In fact, in 1980, one third of re-enlistees into combat arms came from other Army career fields. This came on the heels of 1979 (a mere six years after the AVF began) being the worst recruiting performance since WWII. This occurred despite compromising standards, including allowing 17-year-olds to serve (15). In 1980, the military’s recruiting and quality issues were so problematic that Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyers coined the phrase “hollow force” in his testimony before Congress to describe how the readiness of the Services was being affected. The moniker went on to become a call-back phrase whenever a military leader describes the severity of concerns about the adequacies of training, recruiting, and equipping the Armed Forces (16).
Desert Storm Era:
While Desert Storm was treated by the public as a great success – and marked a return of public appreciation for the military – within a short period of time the Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan was warning the Army was having difficulty acquiring talent. In 1993, the Youth Attitude Tracking Study found a steady decline of interest in enlistment by prospective recruits, and propensity to serve for 17 – to 21-year-old males had fallen by 37% between FY 1990 to FY 1993 (17). In FY 1998, the Army missed its Active Duty recruiting goal by 801 and 6,290 in FY 1999, and RAND found “indications that the current [undesirable] recruiting situation to some extent reflects ongoing and permanent changes (18)”. This is the same downward recruiting trend the US has historically experienced following major wars (19).
Global War On Terror:
The early years of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) found the Services also missing their recruiting goals. According to a Government Accountability Office report (20), the Army missed its recruiting goal for February 2005, which was significant given that the Army had already called up members from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)2 and moved recruits from its delayed entry programs into basic training.3 Additionally, several of the components had already instituted a “stop loss” policy,4 which some critics have coined a “backdoor draft (21, 22)”.
The Army also had trouble holding on to its junior officers. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the number of officers leaving the service at their first opportunity dropped, but then began to climb from 6.3% in 2003 to 8.6% in 2005. Strikingly, the retention rate for West Point graduates fell from78.1% for the class of 1998 to 65.8% for the class of 2000 (23).
These low retention percentages created a cascading effect on promotion rates, as key staff and command positions were in danger of going unfilled. In FY 2005, there were unusually high rates for major (goal of 80%, and actual rate of 98.4%) and lieutenant colonel (goal of 70%, actual rate of 88.7%). This necessarily led to serious concerns about the quality of selectees (24).
These historic moments illustrate some of the AVF’s readiness, recruiting, and retention features struggles over time. Today, senior military leaders can tend to reflect on these past struggles and believe current difficulties are similar and merely need to be weathered or addressed using time-honored tools until the crises go away. Unfortunately, these approaches come with consequences, and they never fully make the problems go away.
One Response to a Recruiting Crises – Lowering Standards
Project 100,000:
Easily the most recognized example of lowering standards to boost military numbers was the Pentagon’s Project 100,000, initiated in the fall of 1966 (25). When a task force report on military manpower found that one third of American males did not qualify for military service, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara devised a program to use military service as a way of making disadvantaged males more useful to the military and more productive in society when they became veterans (26). These “New Standards Men” were selected from those scoring in the bottom tiers of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and others who would have otherwise deemed medically unqualified (25). Under the program, 100,000 men a year were to be admitted to the ranks. Just over half of them volunteered. It allowed the military to meet its manpower requirements (26), but it came at a cost to units, other Service members, and the men themselves.
By December 1971, the program was halted in conjunction with movement toward an all volunteer force. Project 100,000 had brought in 354,000 men – 91% were admitted based on their lower mental aptitude, and the remaining 9% were those with medical issues that the Services believed could be addressed without compromising service. Air Force Major General Hoyt S. Vandenburg, Jr., spoke of the morale impact this program had when these Airmen arrived at units unable to perform duties, were relegated to work like sweeping because they did not have the aptitude for Air Force duties, but drew the same pay as those who picked up the burden of undone work. In the Air Force, the discharge rate for these Airmen was three times that of other Airmen, and their attrition during training was ten times higher (27), Even worse, the Army had a total of 5,478 of these individuals die while in service, a rate that was three times as high as that of other Soldiers. Additionally, 20,270 were wounded, including 500 who became amputees (25). Later in the decade, Congress imposed a cap on recruiting of not more than 45% from the lowest mental category (26).
Global War On Terror:
During the GWOT – because of recruiting difficulties - the Army again lowered standards for enlistees. This caused a drop in the number of those with a high school diploma. During the 1990s, the rate was nearly 100%, but over time, it had dropped to 79% (28). Moral waivers in the Army went from 4,918 in 2003 to 8,129 in 2006. Greater than 50% of waivers granted in 2006 were for moral issues (29). During GWOT, many of the waivers were for serious misdemeanors and medical conditions. While successes occurred, e.g., some of those granted waivers were shown to re-enlist at a higher rate and make sergeant more quickly, they were also more likely to be discharged for misconduct, desertion, and alcohol and drug issues. In general, those with juvenile felonies, serious waivers, drug/alcohol misuse, and positive drug and alcohol tests were more likely to attrite at 48 months than other Soldiers (30).
Overall, the lowering of standards is troubling. As noted military sociologist Charles Moskos explained, “it increases the likelihood of problems in the unit, discipline problems (31)”. This sentiment was echoed by retired Army General Barry. R. McCaffrey. In reflecting on the longer term implications of such choices, he stated “by and large, these are flawed recruits . . . those getting waivers won’t be the sergeants we want (32)”. Imagine the ramifications of lower standard troops eventually leading higher quality troops and what that dynamic can mean for retention.
Compromising High Standards to Meet Recruitment Goals is Not the Answer:
In traditional types of conflicts, scores on the AFQT can be critical to both individual and team success. A RAND Corporation Study conducted in 2005 found that teams with higher scoring individuals had a 20% greater chance of success. The report noted that, “Replacing a tank gunner who had scored as Category IV (the lowest category) with one who had scored as Category IIIA (in the 50th to 64th percentile) improved the chances of hitting a target by 34%.” Introducing lower scoring troops into a unit compromises mission success (33) and can erode morale and cohesion when higher scoring Service members make up for the inabilities of the lower scoring persons. Leaders must assess whether increasing quantity by introducing low scoring troops is worth the risk to their units and other Service members. These leaders must consider how low scoring will affect the institution if they stay in and progress higher, as well as the replacement costs when they attrite at higher rates than others. Importantly, leaders must evaluate whether they can accept the morality of higher casualty rates for low scoring persons.
A 2018 study found that well-trained, quality troops were a consequential dimension to peacekeeping and multi-national mission results. They said these troops provided a better deterrence, ensured less violence against civilians, were better at monitoring and creating buffer zones (34). Similarly, the Army’s field manual on counterinsurgency emphasizes that successful operations “require Soldiers and Marines at every echelon to possess . . . (a) clear, nuanced and empathetic appreciation of the essential nature of the conflict . . . understanding of the motivation, strengths, and weaknesses of the insurgent” and knowledge of the local culture. In short, “asymmetric warfare” requires higher quality Soldiers (35).
Lowering standards tends to occur simultaneously with increased pressure on recruiters, which can sometimes have the effect of causing them to cut corners and commit violations, including falsifying documents. A GAO report found that allegations of wrongdoing increased from 4,400 to 6,600 from 2004 to 2005, when pressure was heightened during the recruiting crunch for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was also a more than 50% increase in substantiated allegations (36).
Recruiting into the military is, of course, an expensive and time-consuming operation. But research has shown that those who drop out of high school tend to drop out of the military. A study of Soldiers receiving waivers who had enlisted between 2003 and 2008 found the number granted medical and moral waivers increased during that period from 6.8% and 12.4% respectively to 9.2% and 19.7%. The findings demonstrated that Soldiers granted waivers were more likely to test positive for an illicit substance, be screened for alcohol/drug abuse, or leave the Army due to violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or because of behavioral misconduct (37). Most recently, the Army and Navy (38) have implemented programs to assist potential recruits who had low ASVAB scores and/or could not meet entrance level weight standards. In late 2023, the Army proudly touted that 95% of attendees at the US Army’s Future Soldier Preparatory Course from August 2022 and May 2023 improved their scores by about 18 points (39). One’s aptitude does not increase with training, so presumably, the test is flawed, students have more difficulty with the test than other generations, or these students are actually Category IV and have been passed along.
In summary:
“A lot went wrong on D-Day — especially for the Americans, who were the first to launch the invasion . . . thousands of U.S. paratroopers died during their drop behind enemy lines at Utah Beach . . . the Omaha offensive turned out to be the bloodiest of the day, largely in part because Army intelligence underestimated the German stronghold there . . . General Omar Bradley, who led the Omaha forces, nearly considered abandoning the operation . . . somehow, though, both sectors of U.S. troops managed to advance their positions for overall success (40).
It was the high quality of the junior men – the lieutenants and sergeants - that carried the day on June 6, 1945. Clearly, the military must continue to recruit to a high standard.
Alternative Responses to the Recruiting Crises
Include Historical Contributions of Immigrants to the Military in Any Study Regarding Immigration Reform:
One of the external factors adversely affecting the long-term picture for recruiting is the gradual decline in population growth. Population growth is determined by deaths, birth rate, and immigration. The US population growth rate is expected to slow to 0.3% between 2023 and 2053, whereas from 1983 to 2022, the rate was 0.8%. By 2042, deaths will outpace births in the US, so net immigration will become the source for population growth (41). Given this, immigrants will eventually become a higher percentage of the American military.
The significant historical contribution of immigrants to America’s national defense should be considered in any conversation about immigration reform and any strategy for expanding the potential recruiting pool, as immigrants have been key throughout US military history. For example, 20% of Union troops during the Civil War were immigrants, and about 18% of those who served in the US military in World War I were, as well (42). In World War II, over 300,000 immigrants joined the American Armed Forces (109,000 of them were noncitizens) (43). The caliber of service immigrants has brought to the fight is indicative of the fact that 22% of Congressional Medals of Honor have gone to immigrants (44).
The United States has about 700,000 immigrant veterans (many of whom are not citizens). About 45,000 currently serve. Annually, 5,000 permanent, legal immigrant residents of the US with a GED/high school diplomas who are English speakers and are allowed to work in the country can become naturalized citizens after a prescribed period of service (45).
The Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) has been a key means of achieving this. It was a George W. Bush Administration program, but it became a target of immigration changes brought by the Trump Administration in 2017 (46) More than 10,000 foreign-born nonresidents have enlisted since the program was started. This and other programs authorizing citizenship in exchange for military service have great potential for addressing today’s recruiting shortfalls and should be considered in any discussion of immigration reform (47).
Reevaluate “One-Size Fits All” Physical Standards:
As the data have demonstrated, only 23% of the target population is qualified to serve, and many of them are disqualified due to physical fitness or medical reasons. Yet, as the Service secretaries indicated in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, they need much more than infantrymen (48). Distinct differences have long existed in required physical capabilities within the Services. One need only to examine the physical requirements of an aspiring Army Ranger (49) versus the physical requirements for a driver to see this. Certainly, an Air Force drone pilot does not require the same tolerance to “G” forces as a fighter pilot (50). Yet, the military continues to recruit under this “one-size fits-all” model. Israel is a leader in finding alternatives to this approach, and they have set up different requirements for the different services (51).
A 2013 study examined whether the one-size-fits-all approach is sound. Does the Army need every Soldier at the same level of fitness as those whose mission is to engage in active combat? The study used the US Navy as an example of a force that has two existing fitness standards. Namely, the Marine Corps physical training requirements are much different from the Navy at large. The Army could identify evidence-based standard for combat support and combat service support specialties that would not require the identical fitness standards as those in the combat arms. This could make service attractive to more people, and it could mean a relaxation in physical fitness standards inconsistent with the work the Soldier does. Hence, this policy could significantly expand the eligible population of recruits (52).
Encourage and Accept More Medical Waivers for Enlistment:
If the military Services already have different expectations and levels of fitness based on differing duty requirements, it may be possible to revamp the system for granting medical waivers for enlistment without sacrificing readiness. Lieutenant Commander Matthew Schweers, US Navy, in a March 2024 Proceedings article, advocated for reclassifying occupations to reflect the reality of the degree of fitness required and the environments in which they are required to operate. He proposed that revisiting standards could allow for an expansion of the recruiting pool (53). Similarly, in 2006, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine encouraged a reexamination of physical and medical standards, stating DoD should conduct empirical analysis to determine which characteristics and outcomes, like attrition and injury, were correlated. They also recommended conducting cost-performance analysis to evaluate the cost implications of trade offs (54).
According to the 2022 Accession Medical Standards Analysis and Research Activity Report, 13-16% of those examined at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) were deemed disqualified, yet only 47-66% applied for a waiver. Of those who applied for waivers, 61-73% were approved. Given the study examined a total of 1.35 million applicants from 2016 to 2020 – and of the applicants rejected in that period 85,000 did not apply for a waiver – the existing waiver approval rates mean that many of those applicants would have successfully accessed into the military (55).
Current data on GEN Z—medical, obesity, and mental health reveal they frequently have been or are being treated for conditions that would block their enlistment or require a waiver. Forty two percent of them have been diagnosed with a mental health condition—anxiety, depression, attention deficit disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder are among the most frequent diagnoses. Of those diagnosed with a behavioral health condition, 90% were diagnosed for anxiety, and 78% were diagnosed for depression. Slightly more than one quarter of these diagnoses occurred during the pandemic. More than half Generation Z is on behavioral health medications that would cause them to be screened out of the medical screening at the MEPS, and one in five receive therapy. One quarter of them say they have more bad days than good (56).
The current medical and behavioral health screening process was designed for different generational realities and was shaped by antiquated policy and legislation. As Lieutenant Matthew Weiss points out in his book We Don’t Want You, Uncle Sam: Examining the Military Recruiting Crisis with Generation Z,” Generation Z has had access to more healthcare than previous generations, and, correspondingly, they tend to appear at the MEPS on more medications and receiving more treatment than those who came before. He advocates for a comprehensive review of Department of Defense Instruction 6130.03 (Medical Standards for Military Service: Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction). He recommends, instead, a new, evidence-based list of conditions, treatments, and medications, by military occupational skill (57).
In March 2022, DoD implemented the military’s new electronic health records system – entitled MHS Genesis – across US Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM). The system was designed to serve the needs of Service members while they were recruits, during their period of military service, and – eventually – as they transitioned to veterans’ status. While these medical and behavioral health enlistment standards may protect at-risk recruits from injury during service, provide military units with healthy Service members, and reduce long-term costs of care and treatment of veterans, it may not reflect current medical realities.
Once rolled out across MEPCOM the system became a recruiters’ nightmare, forcing potential recruits to track down any medical or mental health treatments that were flagged. This placed a huge administrative burden on potential recruits and created long delays. Some potential recruits simply walked away (58).
In short, the current system may be screening out people needlessly. Additionally, Gen Z is unlikely to be tolerant of the administrative burden and wait times associated with MHS Genesis. Even a waiver discussion may quite simply drive away good candidates.
Recruit More Women:
According to DoD, females now make up 17.3% of the active-duty force – a total of 231,741 members.59 In 2022, however, only 12% of Army recruiters were female, and part of the reason the percentage has remained so low is that the overall percentage of females is low (60). It has been many decades since females were integrated with their male peers (61), and restrictions have been lifted regarding many of the types of duties female Service members can perform (62). The wisdom and necessity of increasing their numbers is becoming increasingly difficult to overlook.
The demographics are now demonstrating that females could represent a larger percentage of high-quality recruits. Not only are there more female college graduates (44% to 33% for males), but males have also been “dropping out” of the workforce over the past 30 years. Males are also more likely to have problems with drug use, and one in seven has a felony conviction (63).
Clearly, females should be a potential target for military recruiters (64). This reality is brought home by a 2023 RAND Corporation report that said: “Without an effort to integrate both women and men into all roles across DoD, the military will not be able to meet the security situations of today and tomorrow that will require people to unpack complexity and solve problems not as a leader in isolation but cooperatively (65)”.
One reason periodically cited for not expanding the percentage of female troops is that females attrite at higher rates than their male counterparts. The gaps, though, in these rates has been closing; e.g., for FY04, enlisted females attrited at 33.1%, and in FY18, they attrited at 8.6%. Enlisted males, in FY04 attrited at 2.7%, and they attrited at 6.1% in FY18. GAO examined a number of issues related to attrition, but in their concluding remarks, they stated that, while DoD recognized the importance of recruiting and retaining female Service members, they “do not have plans that include goals, performance measures, or timeframes to guide and monitor current or future efforts to recruit and retain female active-duty Service members (66)”. While recruitment numbers remain low, this lack of planning seems irresponsible.
Evaluate the Advantages of Recruiting Older Soldiers:
Recent research has shown the advantages of recruiting older Soldiers. A 2022 RAND report found that “individuals who enlist over the age of 21 perform better as soldiers on several metrics. For instance, recruits in the 25-to-35 age range were about 15 percent less likely to attrit due to poor performance than recruits ages 16-to-18, and about 6 percent more likely to reenlist (67)”. In addition, the report found that enlistees over the age of 21 perform better, have higher scores on the AFQT, are more educated and get promoted quicker than young enlistees (68). Recruiters also told RAND that older recruits were more likely to enter a recruiting station without experiencing outreach (65).
For too many years, the military has focused chiefly on high school seniors. In 2023, Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth announced that, as part of the restructuring of the Army’s recruiting enterprise, they would attempt to recruit one third of their recruits from those who have some college (69). The potential for increasing the number of older recruits with targeted outreach appears to be good, yet it will require the military to do separate outreach and have unique messaging for this group.
Market the Combat Support and Combat Service Support to College Graduates:
Combat Support (CS) refers to units that provide specialized support functions to combat units in the areas of chemical warfare, intelligence, security, and communications. Combat Service Support (CSS) units primarily provide logistical support by providing supply, maintenance, transportation, health care, and other services required by the Soldiers of combat units to continue their missions (70). In a society in which young Americans are unfamiliar with military service - and may not know someone who has served - being unaware that these other career fields exist could further discourage a potential recruit. A 2009 study showed that career field information provided to students who took the ASVAB increased the likelihood of enlistment (71). Encouraging more students to take the ASVAB can help them learn about CS and CSS career fields. Similarly, in the early 2000’s, Charles Moskos, former professor emeritus of sociology at Northwestern University and a leading authority on military sociology, argued surveys had shown peacekeeping missions such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai were the most appealing to college students (72). Certainly, given Generation Z evaluates jobs in terms of how jobs make them more competitive than their peers (73), some noncombat arms jobs may appeal to them more than combat arms roles.
Within an all-volunteer force, potential Gen Z recruits can vote with their feet. According to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, “They (Gen Z) are looking for purpose in their careers . . . looking for flexible career paths, which would cause us to sort of shift away from our hierarchical siloed career paths that we currently have to more of a jungle gym model, which is what they’re looking for . . . we are trying to infuse some more of that flexibility (74)”. The military Services must adapt to better meet the needs of this target generation.
Conclusion:
When military senior leaders and Defense officials choose to compromise in recruit quality, the Services assume risk for unit structure, training, cohesion, reliability, and lethality. Too often, they may feel they are making short-term decisions to bolster recruiting when they do this. However, the effects tend to be longer term and often deleterious.
America’s demography, physical and mental health realties, generational changes, and the job market will affect the foreseeable future of military recruiting. This paper has offered short-term means of addressing the current crisis but acknowledges that substantive, long-term changes are essential for sustaining a strong national defense. When facing a crisis of the magnitude of today’s military manning challenge, DoD officials and military senior leaders need a full appreciation for how compromises affect the lethality, reliability, and sustainability of the force. They must see beyond meeting a near-term recruiting goal and must resist the temptation to ignore the longer term second and third order effects of the short-term decisions they are making. Indeed, America’s capacity to defend herself and her allies is at risk.
The truth of the matter is that you always know the right thing to do. The hard part is doing it. -Norman Schwartzkopf, General, US Army (75).
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