US Conduct In Afghanistan Requires A 9/11Commission-Style Review

Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division stand security at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul on August 15. (Marine Sgt. Isaiah Campbell)

The terrorist attack that killed nearly 3,000 Americans and set the US on a course for war in Afghanistan also prompted a formal commission to deeply examine how the US government allowed the attack to happen. Twenty years later, retired Brig. Gen. James Scott O’Meara argues in this op-ed that a similar commission is crucial to examine the war itself, and America’s failures in it, so history doesn’t repeat itself.

In the wake of the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, many hard questions remain not just about America’s last two weeks in the

Southeast Asian nation, but its conduct for 20 years there. For the US to not learn, to not actively seek out valuable lessons that if applied wisely in the future would potentially save lives and avoid tragic outcomes, would be calamitous.

For that reason, Congress should establish a commission for Afghanistan, on the model of the 9/11 Commission, to analyze decisions and to form recommended changes that will potentially prevent a repeat of history.

This effort should include analyzing decisions made over the last 20 years from policy down to tactical level planning and execution. This must not solely focus on the Department of Defense. Interagency and military decisions, plans, execution all need to be examined to assess lessons that would benefit future whole of government endeavors.

Emphasis should focus on policy development, interagency decision-making processes, and how these decisions were carried out, to include measuring progress. Importantly, this commission should not be staffed with members who represent political agendas or parties. Domestic politics has no place here.

America has forgotten its lessons before. The images of Vietnam era helicopters ferrying personnel in and around Kabul brought back images from 1975 as the United States then evacuated Americans and Vietnamese from the capital of South Vietnam.

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Sadly, by the mid-1980s lessons from that war had already faded away. Military doctrine was rewritten emphasizing a shift back to “conventional” warfare with focus on the USSR. Lessons learned

from Vietnam were archived. Promising organizational and operational approaches, such as the Office of Civil Operations and Rural Support (CORDS), Combined Action Program, Phoenix Program, and Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine had been removed for military doctrinal publications.

During early operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, once policy makers expanded mission objectives to include nation building, security force assistance; etc., supporting initiatives as forming Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), designing operations informed by COIN doctrine aimed at providing local security without alienating the local population, direct action raids against high-value-targets all faced steep learning curves. Beyond the Department of Defense, interagency preparedness and coordination faced well document challenges and bureaucratic infighting. Sadly, the U.S. was not prepared to transition battlefield successes into viable political solutions that would foster lasting stability.

So now, sunlight must be shined on decision making pitfalls, strategic miscalculation, and, most importantly, on those decisions that had significant consequences. The list of questions is long.

What was the U.S. global strategy? Regional strategy? Were they continually assessed? How was Pakistan factored? Engagement with regional nations? When the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden and decisions were made to takedown the Taliban, what were the assumptions, known facts, considerations contemplated before deciding to conduct what now became a regime change mission?

Was there a transition plan once the Taliban was removed? If not, why not? When the decisions were made to transition the mission to creating a democracy-based, central government what were the

assumptions that fed this policy decisions? How was the decision made? What about the resources, time, and risks in training local police and military forces?

The interagency planning process and its ability to implement policy actions in a unified, balanced manner needs comprehensive review. The phrase “whole of government” is a hollow buzzword. Authorities and funds are siloed across the executive branch. Congressional leadership has taken a backseat.

The US cannot continue to attempt to address 21st century challenges with an executive branch functioning from a structure that was established immediately following the ending of World War II at the start of the Cold War with only marginal changes since.

Focusing on the decision process, on why and how crucial decisions were made, may provide current and future leaders with valuable insights, that, if applied wisely, repeating history may be avoided. Intensified emotions, partisan politics and posturing, bureaucratic inflexibility and “face saving” must not be allowed to infect discovery, learning, reporting, and change implementation processes. Placing the report on the shelf would be a grand failure for both executive and congressional leadership.

It is imperative that lessons from the last twenty years be collected, studied, and used to implement needed changes. The higher purpose being to understand and learn from the numerous policy and military strategy decisions reaching back to 2002. Leveraging previously studies, such as the reports published by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, along with numerous studies examining Iraq should form the starting point.

This is not about a “witch hunt” or “blame game.” This is all about learning and preventing the repeat of history. It’s about future generations.

Brig. Gen. J. Scott O’Meara retired in 2018 following nearly 36 years with the U.S. Marine Corps. His combat assignments include Desert Shield and Desert Storm, three Iraqi Freedom tours, along with Inherent Resolve for which he served as the Chief of Staff. He is currently a senior fellow at the American College of National Security Leaders.